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Abstract—The growing commoditization of the underground
economy has given rise to malware delivery networks, which
charge fees for quickly delivering malware or unwanted soft-
ware to a large number of hosts. To provide this service, a key
method is the orchestration of silent delivery campaigns, which
involve a group of downloaders that receive remote commands
and that deliver their payloads without any user interaction.
These campaigns have not been characterized systematically,
unlike other aspects of malware delivery networks. Moreover,
silent delivery campaigns can evade detection by relying on
inconspicuous downloaders on the client side and on disposable
domain names on the server side.
We describe Beewolf, a system for detecting silent delivery
campaigns from Internet-wide records of download events. The
key observation behind our system is that the downloaders
involved in these campaigns frequently retrieve payloads in
lockstep. Beewolf identifies such locksteps in an unsupervised
and deterministic manner. By exploiting novel techniques and
empirical observations, Beewolf can operate on streaming data.
We utilize Beewolf to study silent delivery campaigns at scale,
on a data set of 33.3 million download events. This investi-
gation yields novel findings, e.g. malware distributed through
compromised software update channels, a substantial overlap
between the delivery ecosystems for malware and unwanted
software, and several types of business relationships within
these ecosystems. Beewolf achieves over 92% true positives and
fewer than 5% false positives. Moreover, Beewolf can detect
suspicious downloaders a median of 165 days ahead of existing
anti-virus products and payload-hosting domains a median of
196 days ahead of existing blacklists.
1. Introduction
The growing commoditization of the underground econ-
omy has given rise to malware delivery networks [8], [28],
which orchestrate campaigns to quickly deliver malware to
a large number of hosts. Understanding these campaigns
can provide new insights into the malware landscape. For
example, the ability to measure the duration of such cam-
paigns would reveal which malware families remain active
and which are likely to stop propagating. By tracking the
downloaders and the domain names associated with each
malware delivery campaign, and the malware payloads dis-
seminated, we could infer the business relationships from
the underground economy. Establishing precise time bounds
for the campaigns would also enable correlation with other
concurrent events, such as additional activities and down-
loads performed by the malware samples delivered within
each campaign. This new understanding has the potential to
expose fragile dependencies in the underground economy,
leading to effective intervention strategies for disrupting the
malware delivery process [39].
Prior work has generally focused on identifying the
malicious domains [1], [3], [5], [28], [29], [33], [36], [42],
the malware families disseminated [13], [19], [23], [26],
[40] and, to a lesser extent, the downloaders utilized on
the client side [26]. Comparatively less attention has been
given to the task of precisely characterizing the relationships
among these entities; for example, a comprehensive ground
truth about past malware delivery campaigns is currently
unavailable. As a step toward understanding campaigns, we
focus on a particular subset called silent delivery campaigns,
which involve a group of downloaders that receive remote
commands and that download their payloads with no user
interaction. These campaigns are particularly attractive to
the organizations that disseminate malware or potentially
unwanted programs (PUPs), as they can evade detection by
utilizing inconspicuous downloaders, to retrieve the pay-
loads, and disposable domain names, to host and serve
it temporarily. We propose unsupervised and deterministic
techniques for detecting silent delivery campaigns. We also
describe the design of a system, called Beewolf,1 which
implements these techniques and can operate either on the
entire data set of download events (offline mode) or on a
stream of data (streaming mode). Using Beewolf, we con-
duct the first systematic study of silent delivery campaigns.
The key observation behind Beewolf is that, when down-
loaders across the Internet are instructed to conduct a cam-
paign, they will all access a common set of DNS domains,
within a short time window, to retrieve the payloads. After
a period of inactivity, the same downloaders will request
additional payloads from a set of fresh domains. This lock-
step behavior exposes the fact that the downloaders are
controlled remotely and reveals the domains involved in
subsequent campaigns. We expect that we can parametrize
lockstep detection to distinguish benign software updates
1. Beewolves are a species of wasp that hunts bees, which are known to
exhibit group behaviors.
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that are initiated remotely and malicious campaigns. In par-
ticular, software updaters repeatedly access the same server-
side infrastructure, while malicious campaigns exhibit a high
domain churn as they try to evade blacklists. Additionally,
we can whitelist the known benign updaters to further re-
duce the false positive rate. Our approach is complementary
to the machine learning techniques proposed for detecting
malicious domains [13], [19], [40], [42]. In contrast to these
techniques, recognizing a lockstep pattern in a stream of
Internet-wide download events yields an intuitive explana-
tion of the underlying activity, without interpreting clusters
of events defined by multiple features.
We formulate lockstep detection as a graph mining
problem. We construct a bipartite graph, where a node
corresponds to either a downloader or a payload hosting
domain, and an edge indicates that a downloader contacted
a domain to retrieve a payload. A lockstep is a near bi-
clique2 in this graph—a graph component that is almost
fully connected, except for a few missing edges—with the
added constraint that the edges are created within a short
time window ∆t. Existing algorithms for lockstep detection
[4], [9], [20] are not well suited for finding silent delivery
campaigns because they require seed nodes to bootstrap the
algorithm and because they are not designed to operate on
streaming data. In contrast, downloaders typically remain
undetected for several months [26], making it difficult to
identify seeds in a timely manner, and malicious domains
can be discarded within days [25], [38], at which point the
information from lockstep detection is no longer actionable.
We propose a novel lockstep detection technique, which
can operate on streams of download events. We perform
the computationally intensive operations (e.g., updating the
bipartite graph and the adjacency lists) incrementally, as new
events are received, and then we detect locksteps using an
efficient linear algorithm. We use this technique in both
of Beewolf’s modes of operation. In offline mode, Bee-
wolf analyzes our entire download events, with the aim of
characterizing lockstep behaviors empirically. In streaming
mode, Beewolf receives data incrementally and prunes the
locksteps detected to focus on suspicious downloaders and
domains.
We utilize Beewolf to conduct a large empirical study
of silent delivery campaigns conducted over one year. We
analyze a data set of 33.3 million download events, observed
on 1.9 million hosts, and we detect over 130,000 locksteps.
These locksteps comprise 1.4 million campaigns. Build-
ing on the observation that many downloaders involved in
lockstep behavior have valid digital signatures, we identify
representative publishers for each lockstep and we ana-
lyze the relationships among publishers. This investigation
yields new insights into silent delivery campaigns, including
malware distributed through compromised software update
channels, a substantial overlap between the malware and
PUP delivery ecosystems, and several types of business
relationships within these ecosystems. We also show that
Beewolf achieves over 92% true positives and fewer than 5%
2. We allow a few edges to be missing to account for download events
that are occasionally not recorded by our data collection infrastructure.
false positives, and that it can detect suspicious downloaders
a median of 165 days ahead of existing anti-virus products
and payload-hosting domains a median of 196 days ahead of
existing blacklists. Building on our empirical investigation,
we implement several optimizations that allow Beewolf to
operate on streaming data.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
1) We conduct a systematic study of malware delivery
campaigns and we report several new findings about
the malware and PUP delivery ecosystems.
2) We propose techniques for discovering silent de-
livery campaigns by detecting lockstep behavior in
large scale collections of download events. These
techniques are unsupervised and deterministic, as
they do not require seed nodes and are not based
on machine learning.
3) We present a system, Beewolf, which implements
these techniques, along with evidence-based op-
timizations that allow it to detect silent delivery
campaigns in a streaming fashion.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we
characterize the threat of silent delivery campaigns and we
state our goals. We describe our data set and the methods we
use for distinguishing between malware and PUPs in Section
3. We discuss the key components of Beewolf in Section
4. In Section 5, we characterize silent delivery campaigns.
In the following sections, we evaluate the performance of
Beewolf. Section 6 presents the detection performance and
in Section 7 we evaluate the performance of Beewolf’s
streaming mode. We review related work in section 8.
2. Threat model
Downloader trojans (also known as droppers) are at the
heart of malware distribution techniques [26]. A downloader
is an executable program that connects to an Internet domain
and downloads other executables (called payloads), usually
in response to remote commands. We focus on the domains
hosting the payloads, which are often distinct from other
components of the malware delivery networks, e.g. exploit
servers, command & control servers, payment servers [41],
and we take only the second level domain (SLD) under a
public suffix3 (e.g., site1.com, site2.co.uk).
Silent delivery campaigns. Malware delivery networks
use a variety of methods to install their downloaders,
e.g. drive-by-download exploits, social engineering, affili-
ate programs [8]. When they receive new payloads from
their clients, the malware delivery networks command their
downloaders to retrieve these payloads on the victim hosts.
This results in coordinated waves of payload delivery, which
often do not require any user intervention to avoid attracting
attention. We term these waves silent delivery campaigns,
by analogy with the silent updating mechanisms increas-
ingly adopted by benign software publishers [14], [32].
A key difference between the silent delivery campaigns
conducted on behalf of malicious and benign payloads is
3. We use Mozilla’s public suffix list from https://publicsuffix.org/.
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that benign campaigns repeatedly access the same server-
side infrastructure, while malicious campaigns exhibit a high
domain churn as they try to evade blacklists. Depending
on the payloads, these campaigns may be malware delivery
campaigns, which drop executables with unambiguously
malicious functionality such as trojan horses, bots, keystroke
loggers, or PUP delivery campaigns, which drop PUPs such
as adware, spyware and even additional droppers.
The detection of domains involved in malware and PUP
distribution has been widely explored using machine learn-
ing techniques [13], [19], [40], [42]. These techniques typi-
cally output clusters of events, defined by multiple features,
which can be difficult to interpret. We investigate a comple-
mentary approach: deterministic techniques, based on the
intuition that temporal patterns in the downloader-domain
interactions can expose remotely controlled downloaders.
Lockstep behavior. The coordinated downloads from silent
delivery campaigns result in lockstep behavior. Intuitively,
lockstep behavior corresponds to repeated observations of
synchronized activity among a group of downloaders (or
domains), which access (are accessed by) the same set
of domains (downloaders) to retrieve payloads, within a
bounded time period. In other words, locksteps capture co-
ordinated downloads that do not experience random delays,
e.g. from manual user intervention. This points to silent
delivery campaigns. As lockstep detection requires several
repeated observations of coordinated downloads, a lockstep
may correspond to one or several delivery campaigns that
use the same infrastructure.
Formally, consider a bipartite graph G = (U, V,E)
where U and V are disjoint set of nodes corresponding to
left hand nodes and right hand nodes, respectively, and an
edge e ∈ E may link two nodes belonging to different sets
but not nodes from the same set. Let ti,j represent the time
at which an edge is formed between node i ∈ U and node
j ∈ V . Further, let U ′ ⊆ U and V ′ ⊆ V . We define a
star [U ′, j,∆t, δt] on U ′ and some central node j ∈ V ′ as
follows:
| U ′ |≥ 2 (1)
(max
i
ti,j −min
i
ti,j) ≤ ∆t ∀i ∈ U ′ (2)
The above equations state that a star contains at least 2 left
hand nodes and the time difference between the addition of
the first and the last edge to the star is at most ∆t.
A lockstep [U ′, V ′,∆t, δt] in G(U, V,E) satisfies the
following constraints:
| U ′ |> 2 (3)
∃V ′i ⊆ V ′ ∀i s.t. | V
′
i |> 2 and | V
′
i |≥ α | V ′ | (4)
(i, j) ∈ E ∀i ∈ U ′, j ∈ V ′i (5)
The above equations specify that a lockstep contains more
than 2 nodes each from U and V and that the subgraph
induced by these nodes is nearly complete. If α = 1.0, this
subgraph is a complete biclique, while for any value αmin ≤
α < 1, the lockstep corresponds to a near-biclique. Such a
near or complete biclique represents a lockstep if it also
satisfies the following temporal constraints, for a predefined
∆t and δt and for 2 distinct stars defined on j, j′ ∈ Vi′ :
(max
i
ti,j −min
i
ti,j) ≤ ∆t ∀i ∈ U ′ (6)
(max
i
ti,j′ −min
i
ti,j′) ≤ ∆t ∀i ∈ U ′ (7)
| max
i
ti,j′ −max
i
ti,j |≥ δt (8)
The above temporal constraints ensure that a lockstep
contains at least 2 stars that are at least δt apart in time.
Further, if the same star occurs in multiple timestamps, we
consider it only once inside a lockstep. We illustrate the
lockstep behavior in Figure 1. For the problem of detecting
silent delivery campaigns, the nodes of the bipartite graph
correspond to downloaders and domains. There is an edge
between a domain and a downloader in the bipartite graph if
the downloader accessed the domain to drop a payload. The
payload information is captured as an attribute on the edge.
A star can have (i) multiple downloaders accessing the same
domain; or (ii) multiple domains being accessed by a single
downloader. The formal definition of a star (equation 2) con-
siders a j which could be either a downloader or a domain.
Note that a single edge does not count as a star because
of condition (1). Having these two different star topologies
help us detect behaviors such as (i) campaign changing to a
different domain after a C&C server takedown, (ii) domains
within a same campaign establishing connection with a new
version of downloader.
In Figure 1, at time t = 0, we observe a star with 3
downloaders accessing a domain. At t = 3δt, although we
observe new stars, they do not correspond to a lockstep
as a lockstep must contain more than 2 domains and 2
downloaders according to our lockstep definition. Then, at
t = 6δt, we observe a near-biclique, with α ≥ 0.8, that
we detect as a lockstep. We can observe that a lockstep
corresponds to a series of campaigns. The lockstep consists
of set of stars across different time windows. We exploit the
gap between these time windows, and define a campaign as
follows. The activities appearing in the time windows with a
gap less than nδt will be considered as a single campaign. If
the gap is larger than nδt, we treat it as a different campaign.
Streaming. We adopt the terminology from [31] and define
a stream processing task as a query that is submitted once
by the user and is executed continuously or periodically by
the system, as updates arrive. The temporal scope of the task
may be either a sliding window or the entire current state of
the graph; lockstep detection falls in both these categories,
as star detection considers new download events that are at
most ∆t apart and a lockstep requires two or more stars
that at least δt apart. The lockstep detection task is a quasi-
continuous query that must produce or update a result when
the user requests it (once per ∆t), rather than keeping the
query result up-to-date whenever the inputs change.
Adversary model. A silent delivery campaign will evade
detection if its nodes from U do not remain active for at
least ∆t + δt or if none of these nodes contacts at least 2
nodes from V . For example, payloads make poor choices for
nodes in our bipartite graph, as they are frequently repacked
3
MINIBAR- 
MASTER,EXE
BI_RUN 
ONCE.EXE
At t = [0, ∆t]
bigspeedpro.com
At t = [3δt, ∆t + 3δt] At t = [6δt,∆t + 6δt]
bispd.com
Lockstep
DetectedBISEHUP 
35464.EXE
2013-01-06
2013-01-24
2013-01-13
payloads
Trojan.generic (mal) 
Smote Ltd. (ppi) 
YellowSoft Inc (pup) 
DealPly  
Technologies Ltd. (pup) 
betwikx (pup) 
…16 PUP / 1 Malware
MINIBAR- 
MASTER,EXE
BI_RUN 
ONCE.EXE
BISEHUP 
35464.EXE
MINIBAR- 
MASTER,EXE
BI_RUN 
ONCE.EXE
BISEHUP 
35464.EXE
bigspeedpro.com
cloudfront.net
bispd.com
bigspeedpro.com
Figure 1: Lockstep Illustration (Red color corresponds to existing nodes and edges. Green color corresponds to new nodes
and edges which we receive in the data stream in an online fashion).
and some malware families seek to deliver unique samples
to each host [8]. We consider adversaries that have access to
some varied, but limited, resources—e.g. downloaders that
get updated periodically but not daily (which could raise
suspicions), a limited stockpile of domains—so that we can
find some values for ∆t and δt that allow us to detect their
lockstep behavior.
Goals. Lockstep detection is challenging when analyzing
large volumes of data. For example, finding a biclique
with the maximum number of edges is an NP complete
problem [35]. It is also not clear a priori how to parametrize
lockstep detection in order to distinguish benign software
dissemination from malware delivery.
Our first goal is to build an efficient and scalable system
for detecting lockstep behavior. Our system should be un-
supervised, i.e., it should not require any prior information
or seed nodes. The system should be able to operate in
real time and to build the locksteps incrementally, as the
stream of stars are collected and fed to our system. While
we evaluate our system using telemetry collected worldwide,
similar to data available to security companies, OS vendors,
or ISPs, we also aim to lower the deployment bar for small
enterprises. Specifically, our system should detect locksteps
if at least three victims are infected by the same campaign.
Our second goal is to conduct a large scale empirical
study of silent delivery campaigns. These campaigns may
deliver benign software, PUPs, malware or a combination
of these payload types. We aim to illuminate the charac-
teristics and differences among the campaigns conducted
by various organizations, and to expose the business rela-
tionships among these organizations. Finally, our third goal
is to incorporate this domain knowledge into our lockstep
detection system and to assess how well it can identify
suspicious activity, such as malware or PUP dissemination
campaigns. Using external information about the malicious-
ness of downloaders and domains caught in locksteps, we
aim to assess the true positive and false positive rates4 of this
detection system. We also aim to measure the lead detection
time, compared to the existing sources.
Non-goals. We do not aim to detect all possible malware de-
livery vectors, e.g. download instructions hardcoded into the
droppers, malware and PUPs distributed through software
bundles, vulnerability exploits, or other mechanisms that do
not involve remotely controlling a group of downloaders.
4. We cannot estimate the false negative rate because we lack ground
truth about malware delivery campaigns. An undetected malicious down-
loader may be either a false negative or a dropper not controlled remotely.
Lockstep Behaviors 127,495
typedlr:dom 67,094
typedom:dlr 60,401
Total Downloaders 83,088
Domains accessed 60,002
Download events 33.3 million
Total Payloads 0.7 million
Hosts 1.9 million
TABLE 1: Summary of our data sets of the year 2013.
Our campaigns do not aim to capture the end-to-end attack
kill chain and do not include activities performed by the
payloads on the hosts where they were downloaded. Finally,
our system should detect silent delivery campaigns in a
deterministic manner, without using machine learning.
3. Data sets
In this section, we describe our data sets, our ground
truth and our method for distinguishing malware from PUPs.
3.1. Data Sources
We utilize a large data set of download events, collected
by Kwon et al. [26]. These events were reconstructed from
observations on end hosts. From this data we utilize the
SHA2 hash of the downloader and the downloaded file
(payload), the source domain of the download, and the
timestamp of the event. We focus on events from 2013, as
the data set has good coverage for that year.
We exclude the downloads performed by Web browsers,
which typically involve user actions. We identify the top 5
browsers in our data set by searching the digital signatures
for the following <publisher, product> pairs: <Microsoft
Corporation, Internet Explorer>, <Google Inc, Chrome>,
<Mozilla Corporation, Firefox>, <Apple Inc, Safari>,
<Opera Software, Opera>. Table 1 summarizes our data
after this filtering step.
3.2. Ground Truth Data
While ground truth for malware delivery campaigns is
currently unavailable, we collect ground truth about executa-
bles from multiple sources.
VirusTotal. VirusTotal5 provides file scan reports for up to
54 anti-virus (AV) products. We query VirusTotal for the
hash of each downloader and payload in our data set to ob-
tain its first-seen timestamp, the number of AV products that
5. https://www.virustotal.com/
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flagged it as malicious, the AV detection names assigned to
it, the total number of AV products utilized for scanning, and
the corresponding file signatures. We were able to retrieve
reports for about 17% of the binaries from 2013. In line
with prior work [23], [26], we set a threshold rmal ≥30%
and we flag the files that meet the condition.
This process selects both malware and potentially un-
wanted programs (PUPs). To further separate them, we
search the AV labels given to these samples for the fol-
lowing keywords: “adware”, “not-a-virus”, “not malicious”,
“potentially”, “unwanted”, “pup”, “pua”, “riskware”, “tool-
bar”, “grayware”, “unwnt”, and “adload” [23]. We define
rpup to be the percentage of AV labels that include one
of these keywords. We consider that a binary is malware
if rmal ≥30% and rpup ≤10%. It is treated as PUP if
rpup >10% and rmal ≥30%. We identify 1,228 malware
samples and 15,350 PUPs through this process.
National Software Reference Library. NSRL6 provides a
reference data set (RDS) of benign software. We collect
the MD5 signatures of the applications and their list of
publishers. The version of the RDS we use is at 2.52, which
was released in April 2015. We consider benign all the
executables where either (1) the hash matches or (2) the
publisher matches and has a valid signature.
Information about publishers. To identify publishers en-
gaged in the Pay-Per-Install (PPI) business [8], we utilize
two lists of PPI providers from underground forums.78 For
other types of publishers, we query the Reason Labs knowl-
edge base.9 This service provides details about the publisher,
e.g. whether it is considered safe or if it uses its certificates
to sign PUPs.
4. Detecting lockstep behaviors in real-time
In this section, we describe the design and implemen-
tation of Beewolf, which detects lockstep behavior in real-
time. Beewolf can operate in two modes. In offline mode, our
system analyzes our entire download events, with the aim
of characterizing lockstep behaviors empirically. We utilize
this mode in our experiments from Sections 5 and 6. In
streaming mode, Beewolf receives data incrementally and
prunes the locksteps detected to focus on suspicious down-
loaders and domains. We evaluate this mode in Section 7.
We implement Beewolf in Python, using the NetworkX10
package to manipulate graphs.
As illustrated in Figure 2, Beewolf consists of a
data analysis pipeline with four components: star detec-
tion, galaxy graph construction, frequent pattern (FP) tree
construction, and lockstep detection. We also maintain a
database with three tables: download_events, stars,
and locksteps. The first step is to detect new star pat-
terns as new download events are recorded. In the rest of the
6. http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/
7. http://ppitalk.com/showthread.php/38-List-of-Pay-Per-Install-Companies
8. http://www.blackhatworld.com/seo/list-of-pay-per-install-ppi-networks.
646987/
9. https://www.reasoncoresecurity.com/knowledgebase.aspx
10. https://networkx.github.io/
paper, we refer to the bipartite graph as “galaxy graph”. The
stars detected are updated incrementally in the galaxy graph.
Further, we traverse the galaxy graph to build the FP tree
which is an in-memory data structure to detect locksteps.
The algorithm pseudocode of Beewolf can be found at the
Appendix.
4.1. Whitelisting
As discussed in section 3.2, we identify benign binaries
using the NSRL data. We maintain a whitelist, which con-
sists of these benign binaries. Prior to the main data analysis
pipeline, we filter out the download events generated by
the benign downloaders, which are listed in the whitelist.
We do not expect this whitelist to be exhaustive—NSRL
may not include all the legitimate downloaders—but this
simple filtering step helps us focus on the most suspicious
campaigns and improves Beewolf’s performance. Moreover,
while it is likely unfeasible to whitelist all benign software,
only a few programs have a downloader functionality. Our
whitelist contains 6,996 downloaders.
4.2. Star Detection
Each row of the download_events table consists of
a downloader (dlr), corresponding domain accessed (dom),
the downloaded file (payload), and the timestamp when the
download event occurred. We assign a unique identifier to
each download event in the table, and sort them in ascending
time order. Conceptually, each download event corresponds
to an edge in the galaxy graph, linking a node represented
by dlr with a node represented by dom.
Given a moving time window of size ∆t, we query the
events that occurred within this time range. We utilize these
series of download events to identify star patterns. We can
create stars in two ways, by starting from a downloader
and aggregating the adjacent domains, or vice versa. We
assign unique identifiers to each new star, and record the
associated events in the stars table. After generating all
the stars within ∆t, we slide the time window by δt and
repeat the star detection process, until the end of the time
window reaches the last event.
4.3. Galaxy Graph
Beewolf maintains the galaxy graph, which has two
kinds of nodes: nodes that correspond to downloader pro-
grams and nodes that correspond to domains hosting pay-
loads. We represent a node in the galaxy graph as nodegg.
We explicitly maintain only 1 edge between a downloader
and a domain. However, there can arise situations where a
downloader accesses a domain at different times; we discuss
how we deal with this situation later in this section.
We update the galaxy graph incrementally, using the star
patterns detected in the previous step. As explained earlier,
there are 2 types of stars. We consider only one type of
star and ignore the other while detecting and updating the
stars to the galaxy graph; galaxy graph at any point contains
only one type of stars. For simpler explanation, we discuss
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Figure 2: System architecture.
only the star type corresponding to multiple downloaders
accessing the same domain; the same explanation can be
extended when dealing with the other star type. Further, we
present results corresponding to both star types, when dealt
separately in Section 5.
When we detect a star, we add the central node (domain)
and its adjacent nodes (downloaders accessing it) to the
bipartite graph, and we create the corresponding edges. For
each newly detected star, while adding the central node
(domain) we also specify the star id (e.g. (2) domB), in
order to separate it from the nodes corresponding to domB
from different stars. When the new star is a superset of some
existing star in the galaxy graph, we replace the existing
star with it. If it is a subset of some existing star, Beewolf
discards it from further processing.
4.4. FP tree
We traverse the galaxy graph, constructed in the previous
step, to build a data structure called a Frequent Pattern (FP)
tree. The FP tree was used successfully in other domains, for
example to design scalable algorithms for frequent pattern
mining [18]. We employ the FP tree algorithm from [30].
Let us represent a node in the FP tree as nodefp. Given the
galaxy graph G = (U, V,E), the algorithm starts by sorting
the adjacency list of V . The adjacency list is a representation
of the galaxy graph and consists of the collection of neighbor
lists for each nodegg ∈ V . The sorting is done in two
rounds. In the first round, we sort each nodegg v ∈ V
by their degree (the number of v’s neighbors in U ), in
descending order. In the second round we sort each list of
neighbors. Specifically, we sort the neighbors u of v by
their degree (the number of u’s neighbors in V ), also in
descending order.
Once the sorting is done, we start building the FP tree
by creating a root nodefp in the tree. For each neighbor
u of v, we traverse the FP tree starting from the root and
check if u is the child of the current nodefp. If this is the
case, we set the current nodefp as u and append v to its
visited list. Otherwise, we first add u as the child of the
current nodefp and repeat the same process. We continue
this process until we have checked all nodegg v′s and their
corresponding neighbors. Figure 3 illustrates the FP tree
construction procedure given the galaxy graph as input.
Once the FP tree is constructed, we can traverse it
to detect all the complete bicliques of the galaxy graph.
However, FP tree has some limitations : (a) FP tree does
not return near-bicliques. (b) FP tree misses part of complete
bicliques when overlap exists at the left hand nodes between
root
dlrC
dlrB dlrD
dlrA dlrE dlrE
dlrD
(2)domB,(3)domA,(1)domA,(4)domC
(2)domB,(3)domA,(1)domA
(2)domB,(1)domA
(2)domB
(3)domA
(4)domC
(4)domC
(2)domB dlrC dlrB dlrA dlrD
(3)domA dlrC dlrB dlrE
(1)domA dlrC dlrB dlrA
(4)domC dlrC dlrD dlrE
dlrA
(1)domA
(2)domB
(3)domA
(4)domC
dlrB
dlrC
dlrD
dlrE
Lockstep: [dlrC,dlrB,dlrA] [(2)domB,(1)domA]
Lockstep: [dlrC,dlrB] [(2)domB,(3)domA,(1)domA]
Figure 3: Example of FP tree construction: (a) Galaxy graph,
(b) Sorted adjacency list, (c) FP tree.
a larger biclique and a smaller biclique. This results in the
overlapped region being missed against the smaller biclique.
We address how we handle these limitations in the next
section.
4.5. Lockstep Detection
After constructing the FP tree, we move to the lockstep
detection phase. Each path downwards from the root to
a nodefp A in the FP tree indicates a lockstep. The set
of nodes along the path corresponds to the downloaders,
and the visited list of A corresponds to the domains in the
lockstep. For example, in Figure 3, dlrC → dlrB → dlrA,
the resulting lockstep will be [(domB , domA), (dlrC , dlrB ,
dlrA)]. When identifying a lockstep, we remove the star id
from the domain nodes; however, we store the star ids along
with the lockstep, so that we do not lose the download events
that resulted from the lockstep behavior. We can observe in
Figure 3 that some bicliques are not interesting; for example,
when A is a child of the root (e.g. dlrC), we get a star
centered on A, and when A is a leaf (e.g. dlrE), we get a
star centered on the single domain from the visited list of
A (e.g. domA). To avoid generating locksteps that are too
small or that are a subset of a larger lockstep, we filter out
the locksteps that satisfy the following conditions: (1) the
number of downloaders or the domains are either below 3;
or (2) A has a child with same visited list.
Partially missing locksteps. The FP tree captures most of
the locksteps, however it misses the small locksteps that
share part of the left hand elements with the larger lockstep.
In Figure 3, we see that path dlrC → dlrD should have
produced the lockstep of [(domB , domC), (dlrC , dlrD)].
However, because dlrC and dlrD are the part of the longer
path dlrC → dlrB → dlrA → dlrD, (2)domB fails to visit
the corresponding path. We observe that this phenomenon
occurs at the nodes that appear in multiple paths, such
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as dlrD and dlrE in our example. We can recover the
missing locksteps by maintaining different node versions,
for each path where the node appears, and by constructing a
separate FP tree only on the stars that contain the node with
multiple versions. To cover all the locksteps, we could do
this recursively until there is no node with multiple versions
in the FP tree. However, considering the overhead due to the
recursive computation and the chance that the near-biclique
algorithm would help recover some of the partially missing
locksteps as explained in the next paragraph, we only apply
the FP tree construction once on each nodes with multiple
versions without recursion.
Near-bicliques. We aim to detect locksteps even in cases
where some edges are missing from the galaxy graph,
e.g. the corresponding download events may have not been
recorded for some reason. These missing edges could pre-
vent some potential nodes to be added to the lockstep.
Therefore we relax the lockstep definition, and search for
subgraphs that include a fraction α ≥ αmin of the edges that
would form a biclique. We set αmin to 0.8 to accommodate
for at most 1 missing edge in the smallest lockstep.
There could be many possible missing edges. We reduce
the search space by exploiting the fact that the adjacent
nodes in the FP tree have higher connectivity than the other
nodes, which implies that by introducing it into the lockstep
will have fewer missing edges.
We point to the end node A of the path, which we
want to extract the lockstep. We start by traversing the FP
tree upwards, toward the root, until we reach a node B
that has a larger visited list. We also count the number of
hops (missingv) required to reach B. We define the relative
complement list as the difference between the visited list of
B and that of A. The relative complement list will be added
to the candidate list with missingv as an attribute. Next,
we look at the children A. Each child will be added to the
candidate list with the size of difference between its visited
list and A′s visited list as the attribute missingu.
Once we get the candidate list, we sort it by the attribute
in ascending order. Starting from the first node in the list,
we add the node into the lockstep and calculate α which
corresponds to the edge density within a lockstep. We stop
when α drops below αmin. We observed that, in practice,
this heuristic is good enough, as the adjacent nodes in the
FP tree are more likely to be connected to the lockstep than
the other nodes.
4.6. Streaming Set-up
When using Beewolf in a streaming setting, we ingest
the download event data in real time. Instead of triggering
our system for each single data stream, we run the system
by processing incoming data as a batch within a fixed period
∆t. Except for the difference in how the data comes in the
system, the rest of the process is identical to that of the
non-streaming setup. The star detection will search for new
stars from the batch data; the new stars will be added to
the galaxy graph; the FP tree will be built from the galaxy
graph; and the lockstep detecion will find new locksteps.
5. Silent distribution campaigns
In this section, we present a large scale empirical study
of silent delivery campaigns. As discussed in Sections 4.2
and 4.3, we can track two types of stars in the galaxy graph:
multiple downloaders accessing a domain (typedlr:dom) and
vice versa (typedom:dlr). These two star types result in
different bicliques, and capture different download activities.
The difference derives from the fact that the central nodes
in the stars may be duplicated in the galaxy graph, when
we add new stars that emerge in later time windows. The
resulting locksteps reflect different distribution strategies.
typedlr:dom account for downloaders that are more stable
than the domains. Conversely, typedom:dlr identify distribu-
tion networks where domains are more stable.
For our empirical analysis, we set a narrow time window,
to detect download events that are remotely triggered and
do not experience delays. More generally, we should choose
a shorter time window than the typical reaction time of
domain blacklists during the observation period. In conse-
quence, we set the time window ∆t to 3 days, and we use
a sliding window δt of 3 days.11
We identify 67,094 locksteps of type typedlr:dom and
60,401 locksteps of type typedom:dlr in our data. Figure 4
illustrates the distributions for three properties of these
locksteps: size, life span, and first detection time. The size
of a lockstep corresponds to the number of nodes, consid-
ering both downloaders and domains in the lockstep. We
deduplicate the central star nodes by removing the star IDs.
Therefore, the number is counted on unique set of nodes
in the lockstep. For both types of locksteps, we observe
that the number of nodes within each lockstep follows a
long tail distribution i.e., there are many small locksteps
and fewer large locksteps. In Figure 4(b), we report the
life span for each lockstep. There are long lived locksteps,
enduring close to a year. As our observation period spans
only one year, there could be locksteps that live longer.
To evaluate the opportunity for early discovery of malware
delivery campaigns, for each lockstep we compute the delay
until its first subset lockstep is formed, which is the time
difference between the addition of the second and the first
star to the lockstep (Figure 4(c)). We observe that, while
the second star does not usually appear in the next time
window, the locksteps nevertheless emerge quickly: both
typedlr:dom and typedom:dlr take a median of 3 windows to
form a lockstep. However, we also observe some locksteps
that emerge after a long delay.
Lockstep attribution. In general, it is challenging to iden-
tify precisely which organizations were controlling the
download activities reflected in the locksteps we detect, as
the domains may no longer be registered and the download-
ers may no longer be active. However, we aim to make a
coarse grained distinction among the distribution campaigns
for malware, PUP and benign software, to compare their
properties and to assess their overlaps. To do so, we observe
that 38.2% (3479 out of 9103) of the downloaders involved
11. During our observation period, domains delivering malware were
blacklisted within 17 days on average [25].
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TABLE 2: Lockstep group statistics.
typedlr:dom
(MDL/PDL/BDL/UDL)
typedom:dlr
(MDL/PDL/BDL/UDL)
PUP 27,522(26,764/501/109/148)
13,117
(11,902/1,202/6/7)
PPI 2,639(2,137/498/4/0)
1,496
(1,164/332/0/0)
BN 3,939(1,749/888/597/705)
2,021
(1,152/840/7/22)
Other 9,203(8,041/1,053/58/51)
5,092
(3,479/1,580/8/25)
Mixed 20,766(14,085/4,069/2,255/357)
36,594
(32,576/2,479/1,449/90)
UK 86(86/0/0/0)
835
(808/27/0/0)
in locksteps are digitally signed, with valid X.509 certifi-
cates. We first analyze these signatures to determine the most
frequent publisher in a lockstep. We consider that a publisher
is the representative publisher (rep-pub) of the lockstep, if
it accounts for more than 50% of the signed downloaders in
the lockstep. If we cannot identify a representative publisher,
we set the lockstep’s rep-pub to mixed. In this manner,
we identify 335 rep-pubs. We investigate the top 50 rep-
pubs from each lockstep type and we manually categorize
them into 6 different groups: potentially unwanted programs
(PUP) [23], pay-per-install (PPI) [8], benign (BN), other,
mixed, and unknown (UK). The first 4 groups inherit the
label of the rep-pub, determined as discussed in Section 3.2.
We place the mixed rep-pubs in a separate group. In
some cases we cannot identify the real publisher behind the
lockstep, as the downloader is an archive extractor (Winzip).
These correspond to the unknown group. Table 2 describes
the distribution of these lockstep groups. While we are able
to label some locksteps in this manner, we observe that most
locksteps involve downloaders that are difficult to place in
a specific category, as many locksteps have mixed rep-pubs.
We therefore perform a second labeling step, based on
the payloads that the locksteps distribute. We distinguish
between malware and PUP payloads with the method de-
scribed in Section 3.2. The labeling is conducted in two
steps. First, the downloaders are labeled by the payloads
they distribute within the lockstep. We say a downloader
is malware downloader (MD), if it distributes at least one
malware.12 In a similar fashion, we label a downloader as
PUP downloader (PD) if it downloads PUP payloads but no
malware. A downloader is labeled as Benign downloader
(BD) if it downloads a benign payload but no suspicious
12. This is an aggressive labeling policy, as even benign downloaders
may be tricked into downloading malware occasionally. However, this
labeling produces a conservative estimate of our false positive rate (as
discussed in Section 2, we do not aim to measure false negatives).
TABLE 3: Lockstep label statistics
typedlr:dom typedom:dlr
MDL 54,497 (81.22%) 51,831 (85.81%)
PDL 7,800 (11.63%) 6,901 (11.43%)
BDL 3,231 (4.82%) 1,500 (2.48%)
UDL 1,566 (2.33%) 169 (0.28%)
(malware, PUP) download. The rest are placed as unknown
downloader (UD). As the next step, we label the locksteps.
The locksteps that include at least one MD are labeled as
malware downloader lockstep (MDL). Similarly, we label a
lockstep as PUP downloader lockstep (PDL) if it contains
PDs but no MDs. We label the locksteps with no suspicious
(MD, PD) downloader as unknown downloader lockstep
(UDL). We note that, as malware families sometimes evade
detection for extended periods of time, not every UDLs
correspond to benign download activities. Therefore, we try
to identify the benign downloader locksteps (BDL) among
the UDLs. Similar to the definition of MDLs and PDLs, the
BDL should contain at least one BD.
We present the result of the labeling in Table 3. For
both lockstep types, MDL occupy more than 80% of the
total number of locksteps while benign are 4.82% and
2.48% for typedlr:dom and typedom:dlr, respectively. Our
higher success rate in labeling with payloads, compared to
labeling only with downloaders, reflects our community’s
focus on detecting and labeling malware, rather than on
understanding the client-side distribution infrastructure.
Identifying campaigns. As discussed in Section 2, we
separate the campaigns within the lockstep by nδt. By
setting n = 3, we identify 1,292,141/71,424/27,145/6,233
campaigns corresponding to MDL/PDL/BDL/UDL. On av-
erage there are 12.2/4.9/5.7/3.6 campaigns per lockstep for
MDL/PDL/BDL.
5.1. Relationships among representative publishers
The locksteps allow us to determine the business rela-
tionships between rep-pubs and payloads and among groups
of rep-pubs. We focus on PPI and PUP providers, which
distribute other executables intentionally. We collect PUP
and PPIs from the top 10 rep-pubs with a high percentage
of MDLs within their locksteps. Each of these rep-pubs
conducted at least 40 campaigns. We also include the known
PPI providers Amonetize Ltd., Conduit Ltd. and
OutBrowse LTD to this list. We investigate which pub-
lishers appear frequently together in lockstep with these 13
rep-pubs. As the downloaders signed by these publishers
simultaneously utilize the same server side infrastructure,
this likely reflects a relationship among the corresponding
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distribution networks. We also determine whether one of
these downloaders was itself downloaded by one of the
the downloaders in the lockstep, which suggests a closer
business connection. We therefore term such relationship
between the publishers as partner. For example, we ob-
serve such partnership relations among some PPI providers,
e.g. Outbrowse Ltd. that frequently delivers down-
loaders from Somoto Ltd.. Additional frequent part-
ners of Somoto Ltd. include Mindad media Ltd.,
IronInstall, betwlkx, and Multiply ROI, which
suggests a stable business relationship with these organiza-
tions.13 The cases where we cannot establish a downloaded-
by relationship among the downloaders in the lockstep may
point to an organization that uses multiple code signing
certificates to evade attribution or to relationships with a
common third party. We term such relationship as neigh-
bor. We illustrate some of these business relationships in
Figure 5. The nodes are the publishers and the edge between
publishers indicate a business relationship, either partner or
neighbor. The thickness of the edge indicates the frequency
of that relationship.
To further illuminate this ecosystem, we employ a com-
munity detection algorithm [7] to the graph illustrated in
Figure 5(a). This algorithm identifies 7 communities. Within
each community, we determine the rep-pub with the highest
betweenness centrality [15], which is the number of shortest
paths between any two nodes that pass through the rep-pub.
This graph centrality measure singles out a node that likely
acts a bridge between other nodes from each community.
• Community #1: OutBrowse. This community represents
the advertisers or the affiliates of the Outbrowse PPI. The
PUPs Multiply ROI and Mindad media Ltd. are
frequently in lockstep with the rep-pub. The other publish-
ers in this community represent variants of the rep-pub’s
certificate: OutBrowse LTD and OutBrowse.
• Community #2: Somoto. This community belongs to
Somoto, which is also a PPI provider. Beside Somoto’s
certificates (Somoto Ltd. and Somoto Israel),
this community includes 12 other publishers.
International News Network Limited, a
known PUP distributor, is tightly connected with
the publishers in this community, suggesting a close
relationship.
• Community #3: raonmedia. 22 publishers belong
to this community. Three PUP publishers including
raonmedia, Pacifics Co., and CIDA showed high
centrality in this community. All three publishers were
located in Busan, Korea and the certificates were issued
by Thawte, Inc., which suggests these publishers could
belong to the same group.
• Community #4: Sendori. Although we see PPI
Conduit Ltd. within the community, PUP Sendori
has a higher centrality. At 77 publishers, this is the
largest community. Sendori was is tightly connected
to most of the publishers within the group, which reflects
13. Several of these publishers attended the 2014 Affiliate Summit in
Las Vegas (http://affiliatesummit.com/).
an aggressive distribution strategy of this PUP.
• Community #5: Amonetize. This group rep-
resents Amonetize Ltd. and several
PUPs. In particular, Shetef Solutions &
Consulting (1998) Ltd. is known to be the
advertiser14 of Amonetize.
• Communities #6 & #7. These communities are small and
include the InstallX PPI and the Wajam PUP.
These results suggest that the partner and neighbor
relationships can expose organizations that utilize distinct
code signing certificates for different activities, e.g. PPI
and PUP. Additionally, the graph communities capture close
relationships among the publishers, such as delivery net-
works that rent the server-side infrastructure from a third
party or publishers that engage in aggressive distribution
campaigns using multiple providers. The graph also includes
instant messengers and file sharing software, which are
likely involved in locksteps resulting from spam campaigns.
5.2. Malware and PUP delivery ecosystems
Downloaders that appear in locksteps with different
labels provide the opportunity to analyze the overlap of
different software distribution ecosystems. 36.7% of the
downloaders (3,345 out of 9,103) are present in both MDLs
and PDLs. These downloaders are associated with 7,635
and 6,886 of typedlr:dom and typedom:dlr PDLs, which
account for 97.8% and 99.8% of all the PDLs. 100 of
these downloaders dropped payloads known to be malicious,
while the other ones downloaded other files in lockstep with
the malware droppers. The PUP publishers from Figure 5
distributed 13 trojan families, including vundo, pasta,
symmi, crone, pahador, pecompact, scar, dapato,
renum, jorik, fareit, llac, and kazy. We also
observed generic trojans, induc (virus), zeroaccess
(botnet), onescan (fakeAV), pincav (keystroke logger),
dnschanger, startpage, and several worms delivered
through these publishers.
To further illuminate the connection of the malware and
PUP delivery ecosystems, we compare the publishers from
our locksteps to the ones from the Malsign blacklist of
certificates used to sign PUP and malware payloads [23].
In this way, we identify 1,926 downloaders signed by 212
publishers from malsign, which were involved in 70,984 and
5,468 of MDLs and PDLs respectively.
This suggests that many publishers thought to belong
to the PUP category are also involved in malware delivery.
Considering that many of the unknown files in our data set
may be malware samples (83% of our payloads were never
submitted to VirusTotal), the number of MDLs is likely
higher.
These results contradict two recent studies [22], [38],
which did not find a substantial overlap between the mal-
ware and PUP delivery ecosystems. The key distinction is
that these studies analyzed direct download relationships
14. https://www.reasoncoresecurity.com/
signer-shetef-solutions-consulting-1998-ltd-40812da0f7cb2ecd495
5fd76e0a6c493.aspx
9
Wajam
Multiply ROI
OutBrowse LTD
OutBrowse
Mindad media Ltd.
International News Network Limited
Somoto Ltd.
Somoto Israel
Conduit Ltd.
Amonetize ltd.
Shetef Solutions & Consulting (1998) Ltd.
Creative Island Media Sendori
Aedge Performance BCN
Softonic International
InstallX
CIDA
raonmedia Pacifics Co.
raonmedia
OutBrowse LTD
Somoto Ltd.
Sendori
InstallX
Amonetize ltd.
Wajam
Amonetize ltd.
Somoto Ltd.
Somoto Israel
OutBrowse LTD
Conduit Ltd.
Wajam
Vitblan telecom sl
Multiply ROI
betwikx
Bandisoft
AB Team d.o.o.
WhiteSmoke Inc
GOLDBAR VENTURES LTD
Aedge Performance BCN
Creative Island Media
OutBrowse
IronInstall
Mindad media Ltd.
InstallX
Sendori
Figure 5: Business relationship: (a) Both partner and neighbor, (b) partner relationship for PPIs. (node color red/or-
ange/blue/gray corresponds to PPI/PUP/benign/other).
between publisher pairs, while lockstep detection allows us
to identify indirect relationships, through the neighbor links
discussed in Section 5.1. These indirect links can over-
come evasive strategies such as certificate polymorphism
or utilizing unsigned downloaders for malicious payloads.
In particular, in Somoto’s locksteps, 90.6% of the down-
loaders, on average, are either unsigned or have invalid
certificates. We also observe several PUPs with over 50% ra-
tio, including Strongvault Online Storage LLC,
Save Valet, and LLC Mail.Ru. Variations in experi-
mental methods may further explain the different results.
Thomas et al. [38] milk PPI downloaders on hosts located in
the US, while our data set includes hosts from 72 countries.
Geographical targeting has been reported previously for PPI
providers [8]. Additionally, their data set covers a different
observation period. In contrast, Kotzias et al. [22] analyze
data from WINE from a time span that largely overlaps with
our observation period. However, they focus on 70 malware
families, excluding for instance trojans that received generic
labels from anti-virus vendors.
5.3. Properties of MDLs
We identify a total of 54,497 and 51,831 locksteps of
typedlr:dom and typedom:dlr, respectively, that download at
least one malware. These MDLs come from 246 and 169
rep-pub each. In addition to the PPI and PUP delivery
vectors discussed above, we observed that malware is some-
times distributed through compromised software updates.
We identified a malware distribution campaign involving
the KMP Media Co., which is a legitimate media player.
The campaign distributed trojan dofoil. The version of
the media player involved in the MDL is 3.6.0.87, which
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is known to have a stack overflow vulnerability15 that was
exploited in the wild.16 Additionally, while experimenting
with larger values for ∆t, we observed a Hewlett-Packard
software updater deliver the hexzone ransomware.17
We observe several features that distinguish MDLs from
other locksteps. Figure 6 illustrates the approximate FP tree
level where the MDLs reside. As each node in the FP
tree corresponds to a lockstep, the typical level of MDLs
indicates the region of the FP tree where we are most
likely to find evidence of malware distribution. This is an
approximation, as we may add or subtract a level when
computing near-bicliques, as described in Section 4.5. The
median FP tree level where locksteps reside is 5, for both
typedlr:dom and typedom:dlr. In other words, the median
number of downloaders in a MDL is 5. This is relatively
close to the root of the FP tree, as malware delivery networks
15. https://www.krcert.or.kr/data/secNoticeView.
do?bulletin writing sequence=2147&queryString=
cGFnZT0xJnNvcnRfY29kZT0mc2VhcmNoX3NvcnQ9a2V5d29y
ZCZzZWFyY2hfd29yZD1pb3M=
16. https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/ff49e145515bdecbca61b7d9
7439959be5b04b1c29d77a0e8c42a1c1bed42aa8
17. We did not find evidence that HP’s code signing certificate was
compromised; it is more likely that the malware was able to infect the
server-side infrastructure involved in software updates. This is consistent
with prior reports of a trojan that was signed by HP after it infected the
company’s systems, but without having compromised any certificates [24].
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rely on only a few downloaders within a time window. This
observation helps us improve the performance of Beewolf
in streaming mode, as discussed in Section 7.
We also observe that MDLs tend to have a large number
of nodes, as illustrated in Figure 7(a). In contrast, although
we see a few large PDLs, around 90% PDLs have fewer
than 25 nodes and over 90% BDLs have fewer than 75
nodes. Figure 7(b) illustrates the number of domains per day
for each locksteps. We observed MDLs showing aggressive
domain churn (more than 7 domains per day). Figure 7(c)
illustrates the number of downloaders per day for each
lockstep. On average, a new downloader appears for ev-
ery 5.8/16.7/11.8 days for MDLs/PDLs/BDLs respectively.
We also observed MDLs showing aggressive downloader
repacking (more than 5 downloaders per day).
6. Detection performance
While the previous section provides empirical insights
into silent distribution campaigns, we now evaluate the
effectiveness of Beewolf as a detection system. We aim
to detect suspicious activity, such as malware and PUP
dissemination campaigns. This information can be used
in several ways. The downloaders and domains caught in
locksteps can help prioritize further analysis, e.g. to attribute
the campaigns to publishers as we demonstrate in Section 5.
It could be combined with other techniques (e.g. DNS
reputation systems [2], [6]) to detect a specific form of
abuse (e.g. botnet activity). An enterprise may also block
all downloads initiated remotely by unknown organizations;
in this case, a few trusted publishers could be added to our
initial whitelist.
We use the locksteps labeled in Section 5 to validate
our system: an MDL or PDL detection represents a true
positive, while a BDL detection is a false positive. For
the true positives, we compute the detection lead time,
compared with the anti-virus products invoked by VirusTotal
(for downloaders) and with three malware blacklists (for
domains). We also analyze the causes of false positive de-
tections. As we lack ground truth about malware distribution
campaigns, we cannot estimate the false negative rate.
Experimental settings. We evaluate Beewolf in offline
mode, and we build on our empirical insights to select the
appropriate configuration parameters. We set ∆t = δt =
3 days, to capture locksteps with a high domain churn.
6.1. Malware and PUP detection
Detection performance. Table 3 lists the numbers of lock-
steps from each category. Overall, the benign locksteps
(BDLs) represent 4.82% and 2.48% of typedlr:dom and
typedom:dlr locksteps, respectively. We observe the highest
fraction of BDLs among the mixed locksteps of typedlr:dom,
perhaps because malware and PUP creators utilize dedicated
malicious infrastructures as well as generic downloaders,
which may also distribute benign software. In contrast, PPI
rep-pubs do not generate any BDL of typedom:dlr and only
4 BDLs of typedlr:dom. Overall, the suspicious locksteps
(MDL or PDL) account for 92.85% and 97.24% of all
locksteps of typedlr:dom and typedom:dlr, respectively.
Detection lead time. As Beewolf is content-agnostic (i.e.
it does not analyze the downloader binaries or the Web
content served by the URLs contacted), we evaluate how
early we can detect suspicious downloaders or domains that
are previously unknown. We consider the downloaders sub-
mitted to VirusTotal in 2013 that have at least one detection
record. We compare the time when Beewolf is able to detect
these downloaders to the time of their first submission to
VirusTotal. Because a downloader detected by Beewolf is
active in the wild, and because VirusTotal invokes up to 54
AV products with updated virus definitions, we consider that
a detection lead time illustrates the opportunity to identify
previously unknown droppers. As explained in Section 5,
a lockstep emerges at the time when the second star is
formed; we estimate the detection time of a downloader
as the earliest detection timestamp among the locksteps that
contain it. Figure 8 illustrates this comparison. The negative
range represents a detection lead time, and the positive range
corresponds to detection lag. We observe 1182 download-
ers detected early and 213 downloaders detected late. The
median detection lead time is 165 days. Among the late
detections, 69 of the downloaders are detected <3 days late,
which suggests that they may detected early with a shorter
∆t. In contrast, the detection lead time seems uniformly
distributed, suggesting that Beewolf can detect both recent
distribution campaigns as well as campaigns that have been
operating for a while.
We also collect URLs blacklisted in 2013 from three
publicly available sources 181920. These URLs correspond
to 394 unique domains, of which 29 were present in our
dataset. Among these 29 domains, 14 domains were caught
in locksteps; the other 15 domains may represent false
negatives, or they may correspond to malware dissemination
techniques other than silent delivery campaigns. As for
downloaders, we estimate the detection lead time for these
14 domains by comparing the lockstep detection dates with
the blacklisting dates. Except for one domain that is detected
36 days later, 13 out of 14 domains are detected early, with
an median lead detection time of 196 days.
False positive analysis. We identified 80 publishers that
are involved in forming the BDLs. The top 50 pub-
lishers account for 50% of the downloaders in BDLs.
22 of these publishers are benign, but they are absent
from NSRL so they were not included in our whitelist.
These were mainly non-US publishers (ESTsoft Corp.,
AhnLab, and NHN corp.), which are not covered by
NSRL, and benign publishers with multiple code-signing
certificates (Skype Limited is listed in NSRL but
Skype Software Sarl is not). These BDLs could have
been avoided with a more comprehensive whitelist. Addi-
tionally, 17 publishers are labeled as Other, 12 as PUP, and
1 as PPI. We suspect that many of their locksteps deliver
18. https://www.malwaredomainlist.com
19. http://www.malwaredomains.com
20. https://www.phishtank.com
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TABLE 4: Community detection and locksteps.
FastGreedy [7] Multilevel [12]
Number of Communities 6919 6439
Average #nodes/community 21 22
Median #nodes/community 2 2
Average #locksteps/community 2042 2387
Median #locksteps/community 7 31
Average Lockstep Coverage 89.7 85.9
Median Lockstep Coverage 91.67 87.5
Average #Unique rep-pubs/community 9 11
undetected malware or PUPs, as VirusTotal reports existed
for only ≈17% of payloads.
6.2. Comparison with alternative techniques
We compare our lockstep detection algorithm with two
alternative techniques for detecting malicious campaigns:
community detection algorithms [7], [12], which have been
explored extensively in the context of graph mining, and
prior algorithm for detecting lockstep behavior [4].
Community Detection. To compare lockstep detection and
community detection algorithms, we construct a typedlr:dom
bipartite graph with all the download events. We employ
2 popular community detection algorithms [7], [12] based
on optimizing modularity i.e., maximizing the edges within
each community and minimizing the edges between com-
munities, and we compare them with the locksteps detected
by Beewolf. We use the Python package igraph21 to run
these algorithms.
Table 4 shows the comparison of these algorithms with
Beewolf. Most of the communities are very small (< 3
nodes). We observe that a large portion of the locksteps
get mapped to the larger communities. The number of
locksteps/community and the number of nodes/community
reflect long tail distributions. We define the lockstep cover-
age as the fraction of locksteps that reside within a single
community. We predominantly observe locksteps having
large (> 80%) coverage. Further, the number of unique
rep-pubs per community is considerably large (10). This
21. http://igraph.org/
suggests that most of the communities are mixed up with
locksteps coming from different publishers. This makes it
difficult to logically assign each community to a particular
group. Community detection algorithms do not account for
the timing of downloads, which makes it hard to pinpoint
coordinated behavior between nodes.
Prior Lockstep Detection Algorithm. We compare the
locksteps detected by our algorithm to locksteps detected by
the serial implementation of the CopyCatch [4] algorithm
over one month (January 2013) of data. We reimplement
CopyCatch, as the code is not available. There are qualitative
differences between our algorithm and CopyCatch. Firstly,
our algorithm is unsupervised. In contrast, CopyCatch re-
quires seed domains corresponding to malicious domains
and also times for all the domains at which some suspicious
activity has occurred. Secondly, given a batch of data, we
detect all the locksteps within that batch; CopyCatch can
detect one single lockstep, which depends to the seed.
Thirdly, CopyCatch solves an optimization problem to detect
locksteps, which makes it highly sensitive to the choice
of seed domains and the times provided. Furthermore, this
serial implementation of CopyCatch is not scalable for
large lockstep sizes; we consider only small locksteps for
comparison.
To make a fair comparison, we generate 470 locksteps
using our algorithm over the one month data. Of these
only 139 locksteps have a size less than 10 which we
consider for comparison. For each lockstep our algorithm
detected, we provide CopyCatch the domains as seed nodes
and the timestamp at which each domain was active in the
lockstep as the seed times. Our algorithm generates 470
locksteps in 7.56 s, taking an average of 0.016 seconds per
lockstep. In contrast, CopyCatch takes 600.9 s to generate
139 locksteps—an average of 4.32 s per lockstep detection.
These results suggest that Beewolf shows promise for pro-
cessing streaming data.
6.3. Robustness to evasion attempts
An adversary could pursue three strategies for evading
Beewolf; we start by explaining these attacks in the context
of typedlr:dom lockstep detection. First, the adversary could
frequently update or repack the downloaders it controls, so
that no downloader is active in different time windows. This
attack would prevent lockstep detection, and many malware
families already employ aggressive repacking rates to evade
detection [8]. However, this strategy might impose a trade-
off for organizations that conduct silent delivery campaigns,
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as they try to render their downloaders inconspicuous, e.g.
by utilizing code signing and by avoiding behaviors that are
not commonly seen in benign downloaders such as software
updaters [26]. The frequent updates and the lower prevalence
of individual hashes that would result from higher repack-
ing rates would make these downloaders look suspicious
to an AV product. Instead of increasing the number of
downloaders, in the second strategy the adversary could
utilize a large number of domains, e.g. from DynDNS or a
similar provider, so that each downloader accesses a single
domain within a time window. This would be expensive
for the adversary, as generating and registering new DNS
domains is more costly than repacking downloaders and
payloads. For example, to protect 500 droppers from lock-
step detection, an adversary would need 5,000 DynDNS
zones each month (Beewolf considers second-level domains
rather than FQDNs), at a current cost of $4,000/month.22
Additionally, this approach would make the domains more
likely to be detected by DNS reputation systems, which
use domain popularity as feature [6]. In practice, Beewolf
detects MDLs that churn through more than 7 domains per
day, as discussed in Section 5.3. The adversary could reduce
the cost by instructing each downloader to randomly select
a domain, from a pool of available domains, and to contact
only that domain for ∆t; then, the downloader would select
another domain, and the reuse rate of domains in the pool
would increase. To detect this, we could increase ∆t, to
cover the point when the downloader switches domains,
and this would in turn force the adversary to further in-
crease the time interval when each downloader accesses a
single domain. Ultimately, the adversary cannot increase this
time interval indefinitely, as domains that serve malware
eventually get blacklisted. Additionally, we observe that the
first two attack strategies involve increasing the downloader
churn and reducing the domain churn, for evading the de-
tection of typedlr:dom locksteps; to evade the detection of
typedom:dlr, these actions should be reversed. This suggests
that it is difficult for an adversary to avoid both types
of lockstep detection simultaneously. Finally, in the third
strategy, the attacker could exploit the filtering step in our
lockstep detection algorithm, for example by ensuring that
MDLs appear deeper in our FP tree. In this case, Beewolf
is still able to capture a subset of these locksteps at lower
FP tree levels.
7. Streaming performance
Experimental settings. We evaluate Beewolf in streaming
mode by feeding the download data in batches. In the
lockstep detection phase, we filter out the FP tree level
over 7, based on the observation that MDLs reside close
to the root of the FP tree. And, we measure the latency of
lockstep detection. Each batch corresponds to a time window
of ∆t = 3 days. As we employ one year of data, we have
121 data points excluding the first batch in our experiment.
For all 121 data points, we measure the elapsed time for
22. http://dyn.com/managed-dns/
each of the four phases in our data analysis (illustrated in
Figure 3). We run our experiments on Amazon’s Elastic
Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2).23 We use one M4.4xlarge
instance, which has a 16-core 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2676
v3 (Haswell) with 64 GB of memory. For this evaluation,
we focus on typedlr:dom graphs.
Streaming performance. Figure 9(a) illustrates the growth
of the data structures that Beewolf maintains. The plots has
a logarithmic Y-axis, to compare both the number of new
stars per batch and the cumulative number of nodes in the
galaxy and the FP tree. On average, a batch contains 225,939
download events. Both the number of nodes in the galaxy
graph and the FP tree grow linearly. At the end, the graph
has 123,335 nodes and 637,814 edges. As the data grows,
the cost for detecting lockstep also grows incrementally.
Figure 9(b) suggests that Beewolf’s runtime is domi-
nated by the lockstep detection phase, which accounts for
97.2% of the total runtime on average. The total runtime
shows three growth patterns: a steep increase for the first
20 batches, a slower increase for most of the period, and
another steep increase starting around batch 94–96. Each
of these growth patterns is linear and follows a regression
line with the coefficients shown in the figure. To further
understand the latency of the lockstep detection step, recall
that this phase consists of two parts: (1) lockstep detection
on the main FP tree, (2) supplementation for finding par-
tially missing locksteps (see Section 4.5). The near-biclique
detection is done during lockstep detection, and it results in
an overhead of at most 10 seconds. As shown in Figure 9(c),
the first part is fast, and requires at most 12 s. Most of the
cost of lockstep detection comes from the supplementation
effort, which induces the three phases of linear growth. In
particular, the number of nodes that have multiple versions
in the FP tree increases significantly around batch 94–96,
which triggers the third growth pattern in the total runtime.
While Beewolf searches for these nodes sequentially,
we note that this could be done in parallel, as the sup-
plementation sub-processes are independent of each other.
To evaluate this potential optimization, we estimate the
lockstep detection time with optimal parallelism. Assuming
that enough computing resources are available for running
all missing lockstep searches in parallel, the cost of this
part of the computation will be determined by the longest
running supplementation. We obtain the total cost of lock-
step detection with optimal parallelism by adding this to the
runtime of lockstep detection on the main FP tree. As shown
in Figure 9(c), this cost is at most 19 seconds, and shows
a single pattern of slow linear growth. The supplementation
phase is important for detecting malicious locksteps: at
the last batch, this phase contributes to 95% of the MDL
detections and 91% of the PDL detections. These locksteps
include 48.7% of the MDs and 80.6% of the PDs.
Overall, these results suggest that the cost of Beewolf’s
first two analysis steps is amortized over time, as we perform
star detection only on the new batch of data and we maintain
the galaxy graph incrementally. The FP tree construction
23. https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
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algorithm is not incremental and requires traversing the
entire graph, but we optimize this step by pruning the
FP tree at level 7, as we do not typically observe MDLs
below this level. Similarly, the lockstep detection requires
traversing the whole FP tree and constructing version lists
for its nodes, but we could optimize this step by performing
the supplementation in parallel. The resulting runtime of
Beewolf increases linearly with the size of the graph. Our
results suggest that maintaining one year of download events
imposes reasonable resource and performance requirements,
even if we execute lockstep detection every day.
8. Related work
Graph-based attack detection. Zhao et al. [43] introduces
BotGraph that detects email accounts involved in spamming.
They exploit the fact that botnet accounts share similar IP
address and build a user-user graph. The aggressive sign-up
behavior forces the botnet accounts to form a large cluster
within the graph. Several works developed a reputation
score system by adopting belief propagation, based on the
intuition of locality. Chau et al. [11] exploit the tendency
of hosts with poor cyber-hygiene having more malware.
They construct a bipartite graph that represents the hosts and
the files that present on those hosts. Observing that several
malware are distributed together, Tamersoy et al. [37] design
a graph with files as nodes where edge is placed between
the nodes that share a common host. Oprea et al. [34]
builds a host vs domain graph incrementally (day-by-day),
and detects malicious domains within a same campaign. In
Beewolf, we maintain a graph based on the accessed by
relationship between downloader and domain. The lockstep
behavior detection returns clusters of downloaders and do-
mains considering the temporal bounds.
Malware distribution. Cova et al. [13] analyzed the rogue
anti-virus campaigns by investigating the malicious domains
involved in the distribution, introduced an attack attribution
method employing feature-based clustering. Vadrevu et al.
[40] introduced AMICO, which is a system for detecting
malware delivery in the live network traffic. They employed
a supervised technique to classify malware download activ-
ities. Invernizzi et al. [19] conducted the study on how the
malware gets delivered through networks, proposed Nazca,
a system that for detecting malicious download events from
the web traffic. Zhang et al. [42] employed unsupervised
technique to identify the group of related severs that are
likely to be involved in the same malware campaign. Con-
trary to these works, we conduct the study solely focusing
on the client side of malware distribution networks, and
employ unsupervised technique not based on features but
on graph patterns. Another difference is in the way we
attribute campaigns. While prior work generally relied on
the properties of the malicious domains, we take advantage
of the code signing behavior of the downloaders.
Spam campaigns. Campaigns have been observed in other
attack domains, for example in the context of spam. Several
studies focused on email spam [21], [27] for example to
measure the conversion rates and to analyze the resources
involved in spam monetization. Spam campaigns have also
been observed on social media sites [16], [17]. Prior work
utilized machine learning techniques to characterize social
media spam campaigns. Some of the the prior techniques
discussed use domain specific features that cannot be applied
on the problem we are focusing on. However, the lockstep
detection algorithm has broad applicability.
Lockstep detection. CopyCatch [4] deals with identifying
locksteps by analyzing the connectivity between users and
pages through the likes relationship. We discuss the lim-
itations of this algorithm and provide a comparison with
Beewolf in Section 6.2. Most of the work in this space
looks at detecting suspicious nodes [20] or suspicious edges
[10] through the lens of outlier detection. SynchroTrap
[9] proposes a malicious account detection system in the
context of social networks to uncover malicious accounts
and campaigns. They cluster users based on the Jaccard
similarity of their actions. Our work is orthogonal to these
techniques. Firstly, Beewolf focusses on detecting malicious
campaigns which correspond to near bipartite cores. Sec-
ondly, our system captures malicious campaigns over a large
time interval; the notion of frequent patterns directly allows
us to capture suspicious behavior. Finally, our algorithm is
unsupervised.
9. Conclusions
We introduce Beewolf, a system for systematically de-
tecting silent delivery campaigns. Beewolf detects lockstep
behavior, which captures a set of downloaders that are
controlled remotely and the domains that they access. Using
Beewolf, we identify and analyze 1.4 million campaigns
conducted in 2013. We describe novel findings about mal-
ware distribution campaigns, such as an overlap between the
malware and PUP delivery ecosystems and the tight business
relationships among several PPI providers. We identify sev-
eral properties of malware distribution locksteps, including
their size, life cycle, and frequent domain changes, which
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allow us to implement several optimizations for detecting
malware delivery campaigns in a streaming fashion. We also
evaluate the performance of Beewolf in streaming mode, and
we show that it scales to large volumes of data.
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Appendix
Pseudocode of Beewolf
Algorithm 1 Star Detection.
Require: Download events within ∆t
1: procedure DETECT NEW STARS
2: Aggregate by dom:
3: for Each event in Download events do
4: if dom is first seen then
5: Initialize dom.dlr list
6: end if
7: if dlr /∈ dom.dlr list then
8: Append dlr to dom.dlr list
9: end if
10: end for
11: Assign star ID and get new stars:
12: Initialize new stars
13: for Each dom do star ← (dom, dom.dlr list)
14: if star /∈ stars then
15: Insert (star id, star) to stars
16: Append (star id, star) to new stars
17: end if
18: end for
19: return new stars
20: end procedure
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Algorithm 2 Galaxy Graph Maintenance.
Require: new stars, G: galaxy graph, G=(U,V,E) .
U, V ∈ nodesgg, E: edges
1: procedure UPDATE GALAXY GRAPH
2: Check set relationship among stars:
3: for star in new stars do
4: star id, dom, dlr list← star . Each v ∈ V
consists of dom, version
5: Initialize is subset← 0
6: for Each v with dom = v.dom do
7: if dlr list ∈ v.neighbors then
8: is subset← 1
9: break
10: end if
11: if v.neighbors ∈ dlr list then
12: Flag v as to remove
13: end if
14: end for
15: if is subset! = 1 then
16: Remove vs at to remove from {V }
17: Add v new ← (dom, star id) to {V }
18: for dlr ∈ dlr list do
19: Add edge dlr, v new
20: end for
21: end if
22: end for
23: return G
24: end procedure
Algorithm 3 FP Tree Construction.
Require: G: galaxy graph, G=(U,V,E)
1: procedure BUILD FP TREE
2: Sort adjacent list of V:
3: Initiate node version(u, 0)
4: Sort v ∈ {V } by v.degree(descending)
5: for v ∈ {V } do
6: Sort u ∈ v.neighbors by
u.degree(descending)
7: end for
8: Insert nodes into FP Tree:
9: for v ∈ {V } do
10: curr node← root
11: for u ∈ v.neighbor do
12: node version[u] + +
13: if u /∈ curr node.children then
14: Add u as child of curr node
15: Initialize curr node.visited
16: end if
17: Add v to curr node.visited
18: curr node← u
19: end for
20: end for
21: return FPtree, node version
22: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Lockstep Detection.
Require: FPtree, αmin, node version
1: procedure EXTRACT LOCKSTEPS
2: Check set relationship among stars:
3: Initialize visit list← [′root′]
4: Initialize locksteps
5: while visit list.length > 0 do
6: curr node← visit list[0]
7: visit list← visit list+ curr node.children
8: if alpha < 1.0 then
9: uset, vset ← GET NEAR −
BICLIQUES
10: else
11: uset, vset ←
path to curr node, curr node.visited
12: end if
13: if Filter check = False then
14: Append (uset, vset) to locksteps
15: end if
16:
17: end while
18: for u with node version > 1 do .
Supplementation phase
19: Prepare stars having u
20: Apply all procedures using stars
21: locksteps← locksteps+ lockstepssupplement
22: end for
23: return locksteps
24: end procedure
25:
26: procedure Filter check
27: if uset.length < 3||vset.length < 3 then return
True
28: end if
29: for child ∈ curr node.children do
30: if curr node.visited = child.visited then re-
turn True
31: end if
32: end for
33: return False
34: end procedure
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Algorithm 5 Near-bicliques
1: procedure GET NEAR-BICLIQUES
2: Initialize candidate list(key, value)
3: Initialize missingv ← 0
4: parent node← curr node.parent
5: while parent node! = root do
6: missingv + +
7: if parent node.visited.length >
curr node.visited.length then
8: for v ∈ parent node.visited −
curr node.visited do
9: Append (v,missingv) to
candidate list
10: end for
11: break
12: end if
13: end while
14: for child ∈ curr node.children do
15: missingu ← (curr node.visited −
child.visited).length
16: Append (child,missing u) to candidate list
17: end for
18: Sort candidate list by value(ascending)
19: Add node from candidate list while α > αmin
return Updated uset, vset
20: end procedure
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